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ADMIRALTY LAW AND PLEASURE BOATING
IN NEBRASKA
I. INTRODUCTION
Pleasure boating, a relatively new phenomenon, has made a
marked appearance in the recreational habits of many Americans.
At the end of 1958, the number of pleasure boats in the United
States was estimated at over seven million.1 As more people take to
the water, there will be an increase in nautical mishaps with a
resulting increase in litigation in both federal and state courts. One
would expect that the legal problems arising from pleasure boat
accidents would be met with an application of state common law.
However, federal admiralty or maritime law2 will apply to pleasure
boat accidents occurring on navigable waters of the United States.3
It will be the purpose of this article to relate some basic concepts
of admiralty law, and to point out some of the problems that might
be encountered in applying admiralty law to cases arising in Ne-
braska.
II. JURISDICTION
The United States Constitution extends the federal judicial
power to "all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction."4 This
federal admiralty jurisdiction is made exclusive by section 1333 of
the Judicial Code, which provides for exclusive jurisdiction of fed-
eral district courts over admiralty cases "saving to suitors in all
cases other remedies to which they are otherwise entitled."5 The
so called "saving clause" has been interpreted to allow nonadmir-
alty and admiralty courts to have concurrent jurisdiction over in
personam admiralty actions.6 Accordingly, a plaintiff has a choice
I Yachting, Jan., 1958, p. 115.
2 The terms "admiralty" and "maritime law" are for the most part
synonomous in this country today. GiLMoaR & BLACK, ADMIRALTY §
1-1, at 1 (1957). The terms will be used interchangeably throughout
the article.
3 See Levinson v. Deupree, 345 U.S. 648 (1953); Niepert v. Cleveland
Elec. Illuminating Co., 241 F.2d 916 (6th Cir. 1957); King v. Testerman,
214 F. Supp. 335 (E.D. Tenn. 1963); Chimene v. Dow, 104 F. Supp. 473
(S.D. Tex. 1952); Mays v. The Eleanor Marie, 103 F. Supp. 271 (E.D.
N.C. 1952); Cashell v. Hart, 143 So.2d 559 (D.C.A. Fla. 1962); But cf.,
McGuire v. City of New York, 192 F. Supp. 866 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
4 U.S. CoNsT. art. III, § 2.
5 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (1964).
6 See Rounds v. Cloverport Foundry & Mach. Co., 237 U.S. 303 (1915);
Knapp, Stout & Co. v. McCaffrey, 177 U.S. 638 (1900); Leon v. Gal-
ceran, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 185 (1870).
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between federal and state courts and even possibly between the
admiralty and law sides of the federal district court.7
The accepted test for admiralty jurisdiction was developed in
The Plymouth8 in 1866. The Court said:
The jurisdiction of the admiralty does not depend upon the fact
that the injury was inflicted by the vessel, but upon the locality-
the high seas, or navigable waters where it occurred. Every
species of tort, however occurring, and whether on board a vessel
or not, if upon the high seas or navigable waters, is of admiralty
cognizance.9
That proposition has been frequently reiterated, 0 and the Supreme
Court has not chosen to re-examine it." Therefore, the test is
the location of the occurrence, rather than the basis of the cause
of action under which the claim is made.
III. WHAT ARE NAVIGABLE WATERS OF THE UNITED
STATES?
The navigability of a body of water for determining judicial
jurisdiction under the admiralty clause will be the primary concern
of this section, although a body of water may be navigable for some
purposes and nonnavigable for others.' 2
When the question of jurisdiction in admiralty first came before
the Supreme Court of the United States in The Steamboat Thomas
Jefferson,3 the Court applied the English rule that the domain of
admiralty was the ebb and flow of the tide, and refused to ex-
tend the jurisdiction of admiralty to an inland body of water. Sub-
7 On the other hand, where a claim asserted is in the nature of a mari-
time lien, enforceable in admiralty by in rem process, only the court
of admiralty may take jurisdiction. See The Hine v. Trevor, 71 U.S.
(4 Wall.) 555 (1866); The Moses Taylor, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 411 (1866).
But see Madruga v. Superior Court of California, 346 U.S. 556 (1954).
8 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 20 (1865).
9 Id. at 36.
10 E.g., Hess v. United States, 361 U.S. 314, 318 (1960); Kermerac v. Coin-
pagnie Generale Transatlantique, 358 U.S. 625, 628 (1959).
" See Weinstein v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 316 F.2d 758 (3d Cir. 1963),
cert. denied, 375 U.S. 940 (1963).
12 See Laurent, Judicial Criteria of Navigability in Federal Cases, 1953
Wis. L. REv. 8, 9. Cases in the area of navigability may be grouped in
classes as follows: "(a) cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction;
(b) cases arising under the Commerce Clause; (c) cases arising under
treaties; (d) cases involving citizens of different states; (e) cases aris-
ing under statutes affecting territories and new states; and (f) cases
involving federal land grants."
'3 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 428 (1825).
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sequently, in The Propeller Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh,14 the Court
repudiated the English rule and held that admiralty jurisdiction
was not restricted to tide waters, but extended to all bodies of
water that were capable of sustaining commerce. A significant
extension of the navigability test was developed in the classic
decision of The Daniel Ball. 5 The test was stated as follows:
Those rivers must be regarded as public navigable rivers in law
which are navigable in fact. And they are navigable in fact when
they are used, or susceptible of being used, in their ordinary con-
dition, as highways for commerce, over which trade and travel
are or may be conducted in the customary modes of trade and
travel on water. And they constitute navigable waters of the
United States within the meaning of the Acts of Congress in con-
tradistinction from navigable waters of the States, when they
form in their ordinary condition by themselves, or by uniting with
other waters, a continued highway over which commerce is or may
be carried on with other States or foreign countries, in the custo-
mary modes in which such commerce is conducted by water.16
Further modifications on the test are:17
1. The extent and manner of commerce on the body of water
is of no great significance, for the test is whether the body of water
in its natural state is capable of sustaining commerce.' 8
2. Artificial obstructions do not preclude a body of water
from being navigable, if the body of water in its natural state was
capable of sustaining commerce.19
3. Navigability does not depend on the particular mode in
which commerce is carried on-whether by steamboats, sailing ves-
sels or flatboats-nor on the presence of occasional difficulties in
navigation. 20
4. Once a waterway is judicially found to be navigable, it re-
mains navigable.
21
There are other cases that have further extended the naviga-
bility test for purposes of Congressional regulation under the com-
merce clause, 22 but the test for determining navigability in ad-
14 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443 (1851).
15 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557 (1871).
16 Id. at 563.
17 Some of the tests listed here arose under the commerce clause but have
been applied in judicial admiralty jurisdiction cases.
18 The Montello, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 430, 441 (1874).
19 Economy Light & Power Co. v. United States, 256 U.S. 113, 123 (1921).
20 United States v. Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. 49, 56 (1926).
21 United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 408 (1940).
22 The test for determining navigability for Congressional regulation un-
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miralty cases has not been so extended.23 The present test for
der the commerce clause is broader than the test for navigability under
the admiralty clause. Compare Oklahoma ex rel. Phillips v. Guy F.
Atkinson Co., 313 U.S. 508 (1941), with United States v. Rio Grande
Dam Irr. Co., 174 U.S. 690 (1899), where the Court held that federal
control is no longer limited to navigable streams but extends to tribu-
taries of navigable streams. See also United States v. Appalachian
Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377 (1940) where the Court further extended
federal control over water that could be made navigable with reason-
able improvements. See Morreale, Federal Power in Western Waters:
The Navigation Power and the Rule of No Compensation, 3 NATURAL
REsouRCEs J. 1, 9 (1963) where the author states, "Theoretically at
least, there are no waters in the United States immune from the
navigation power."
Congress also has power implied from the admiralty grant in
conjunction with the necessary and proper clause to regulate matters
within the admiralty jurisdiction. However, this power to regulate
should not be confused with the federal courts power to determine
what waters are within the admiralty jurisdiction for judicial purposes.
See Panama R.R. v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 375, 385-86 (1924); In re Gar-
nett, 141 U.S. 1, 14 (1891); The Lottawanna, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 558,
575-76 (1874); The Steamer St. Lawrence, 66 U.S. (1 Black) 522, 526-
27 (1861). The distinction between the Congressional power to regu-
late and the federal court's power to determine what waters are with-
in the admiralty jurisdiction becomes paramount when Congress passes
an act declaring a body of water nonnavigable. E.g., 41 Stat. 1105(1921), 33 U.S.C. § 42 (1964), "The Platte River in the State of Mis-
souri is declared to be a nonnavigable stream within the meaning.of
the Constitution and laws of the United States, and jurisdiction over
said river is declared to be vested in the State of Missouri." It could
be argued that this act would be sufficient to divest Congress of its
power to regulate; however, it would not divest the federal court of
its power to determine whether the body of water was navigable for
admiralty judicial jurisdictional purposes. See Panama R.R. v. John-
son, In re Garnett, The Lottawanna, and The Steamer St. Lawrence,
supra. See also Miami Beach Jockey Club, Inc. v. Dern, 83 F.2d 715(D.C. Cir. 1936); United States v. Banister Realty Co., 155 Fed. 583(E.D.N.Y. 1907), where the court recognized the differences between
the criteria developed in cases of admiralty jurisdiction and cases aris-
ing under the commerce clause.
23 See Marine Office of America v. Manion, 241 F. Supp. 621, 622 (D.
Mass. 1965); Madole v. Johnson, 241 F. Supp. 379, 381 (W.D. La. 1965);
Shogry v. Lewis, 225 F. Supp. 741, 742 (W.D. Pa. 1964); In re Madsen's
Petition, 187 F. Supp. 411, 414 (N.D.N.Y. 1960). But see Utah v. United
States, 304 F.2d 23 (10th Cir. 1962); Davis v. United States, 185 F.2d
938 (9th Cir. 1950), cert. denied 340 U.S. 932 (1951); Ingram v. Asso-
ciated Pipeline Contractors, 241 F. Supp. 4 (E.D. La. 1965); Johnson v.
Wurthman, 227 F. Supp. 135 (D. Ore. 1964); In re Howser, 227 F. Supp.
81 (W.D.N.C. 1964); Lopez v. Smith, 145 So.2d 509 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1962); Thornhill v. Skidmore, 227 N.Y.S.2d 793, 32 Misc. 2d 320 (Sup.
Ct. 1961). See also Waite, Pleasure Boating in a Federal Union, 10
BuFF. L. REv. 427, 439 (1961) for a proposed future change in the
admiralty test.
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determining navigability is generally stated as follows: Whether
the body of water where the action arose, in its natural or ordinary
state, is or ever was capable of being used as a highway for com-
merce in the customary modes 24 in which such commerce is con-
ducted by water.25 Although there is agreement that this is the
test, difficulty is encountered when the test is applied to different
factual situations. Consequently, the peculiar circumstances of
each case must be considered when determining the navigability
of a particular body of water.26
IV. ARE THERE ANY NAVIGABLE WATERS OF THE UNITED
STATES LOCATED IN NEBRASKA?
The Missouri River, which extends along the entire eastern
border of Nebraska, is a navigable body of water.2 T Therefore,
any pleasure boat accident occurring on the river is within the
admiralty jurisdiction.
The Platte River, which flows from the western extremity of
the state to the eastern border, has been declared nonnavigable by
the Nebraska Supreme Court on numerous occasions.28  However,
the Nebraska decisions would not be binding in determining the
navigable status of the river for admiralty purposes. The federal
navigability test would control. Accordingly, if it could be shown
that the Platte River in its natural or ordinary state, is or ever was
capable of being used as a highway for commerce in the customary
modes in which such commerce is conducted by water, then the
river would be within the admiralty jurisdiction.2 9
The Republican River, which flows through the southern most
end of the state, has also been held nonnavigable by the Nebraska
24 Customary modes means the modes that were customary at the time
the water was considered navigable, e.g., a court took notice of the fact
that Lewis and Clark navigated the waters in keel boats. Madole v.
Johnson, 241 F. Supp. 379, 382 (W.D. La. 1965).
25 See cases cited in note 23, supra.
26 Madole v. Johnson, 241 F. Supp. 379, 381 (W.D. La. 1965); accord, In-
gram v. Associated Pipeline Contractors, 241 F. Supp. 4 (E.D. La. 1965).
27 Jeffers v. East Omaha Land Co., 134 U.S. 178, 182, 195-96 (1890);
Krumwiede v. Rose, 177 Neb. 570, 129 N.W.2d 491 (1964).
28 Application of Central Public Power & Irr. Dist., 138 Neb. 742, 295 N.W.
386 (1940); Haney v. Hewitt, 105 Neb. 746, 181 N.W. 861 (1921); Mc-
Bride v. Whitaker, 65 Neb. 137, 90 N.W. 966 (1902); Wiggerhorn v.
Lountz, 23 Neb. 690, 37 N.W. 603 (1888).
29 See 1 MORTON, HISTORY OF NEBRASKA 100, 105, 107 (1907) for historical
references to commerce on the Platte River. See also Neb. Terr. Laws
6th Sess. 1859, at 191-96, where there are several references to ferry
boats navigating on the Platte River.
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Supreme Court.30 If this river can meet the federal navigability
requirements, then it could also be considered within the ad-
miralty jurisdiction.31
Carter Lake, located between Iowa and Nebraska, emphasizes
another area where admiralty law is applicable. It has been held
that lakes which cross state boundaries, thus rendering the water
capable of use for interstate transportation, are navigable waters of
the United States.8 2 Carter Lake fits into this category and conse-
quently is within the admiralty jurisdiction.
Lewis and Clark Lake, located on the Missouri River between
Nebraska and South Dakota, is not only an interstate lake, but is
also adjacent to a navigable river. Accordingly, Lewis and Clark
Lake is within the admiralty jurisdiction. The above discussion is
not intended to be a comprehensive coverage of all possible naviga-
ble bodies of water in Nebraska. The purpose of the discussion is
merely to point out that admiralty law is applicable to Nebraska.
V. CHOICE OF LAW
Once a state or federal court has taken jurisdiction over a case
in admiralty, it must then decide which law is applicable-federal
or state statutory law, the maritime law, or state common law.
For most of the nineteenth century, the courts approached
maritime cases as if there were two independent systems of law:
the maritime law to be applied in federal admiralty courts, and
the state common law to be applied in state courts.3 3 In 1917 the
Supreme Court in Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen,3 4 adopted the view
that the admiralty clause requires a uniform application of maritime
law throughout the United States, and that the maritime law is
30 Clark v. Cambridge & Arapahoe Ihr. & Improvement Co., 45 Neb. 798,
64 N.W. 239 (1895).
31 It is noteworthy that the authors of the Republican River Compact, in
its original form, attempted to declare the Republican River nonnavi-
gable. The original draft was approved by Nebraska, Colorado, Kan-
sas, and both Houses of Congress. However, the President of the
United States vetoed the bill because the compact sought to withdraw
the jurisdiction of the United States over the waters of the Republican
River for purposes of navigation. See Wrvt~a, DocuimNTs ON THE
USE AN CONTROL OF THE WATERS OF INTERSTATE AND INTERNATIONAL
STRAms 147-53 (1956).
32 Wilburn Boat Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 348 U.S. 310 (1954);
Davis v. United States, 185 F.2d 938 (9th Cir. 1950), cert. denied 340
U.S. 932 (1951).
33 Belden v. Chase, 150 U.S. 674 (1893).
34 244 U.S. 205 (1917).
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supreme in all maritime cases regardless of the choice of forum. 5
However, the law applied in federal admiralty cases since this deci-
sion has not always been the federal admiralty law. There are sev-
eral instances in which admiralty courts have looked to state law
for a substantive rule of law.36 For example, state law is applied
to wrongful death claims in admiralty because the law of admiralty
has no such remedy.37  The Supreme Court has developed several
lines of authority as to the role of state law in admiralty. There is
the gap theory-if admiralty has no rule state law can be applied.
Another is the opposite of the gap theory-the absence of an ad-
miralty rule is an occupation of the field prohibiting the use of
state law. State laws that supplement an admiralty remedy can be
utilized, but state laws that limit an admiralty remedy cannot.3
In Kossick v. United Fruit Co.,3 9 the Court recognized the confusion
in this area and suggested that it was an aspect of federalism to be
resolved like any other conflict between the state and the national
government, by balancing the state's interest against that of the
government. 40 This so called "balancing of interests" test seems to
have been effectuated in the "maritime but local" doctrine. Under
this doctrine, state law will be applied only if it would not disturb
the policy of uniformity of maritime law.41
Thus far, the cases involving pleasure boat collisions have not
adopted the "balancing of the interests" test. The decisions have
turned on the location of the tort without considering whether or
not a federal interest was present.42 It has been suggested that ad-
35 This rule has since been applied in the following cases: Garrett v.
Moore-McCormick Co., 317 U.S. 239 (1942); Chelentis v. Luckenbach
S.S. Co., 247 U.S. 372 (1918); Intagliata v. Shipowners & Merchants
Towboat Co., 26 Cal. 2d 365, 159 P.2d 1 (1945).
30 For a complete discussion of the problem see Comment, 50 Nw. U.L.
REV. 677 (1955).
37 Wilburn Boat Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 348 U.S. 310 (1955).
38 See Stolz, Pleasure Boating and Admiralty: Erie at Sea, 51 CAL. L.
REV. 661, 701 (1963).
39 365 U.S. 731 (1961).
40 Id. at 739.
41 This doctrine has permitted injured workmen to collect under state
compensation acts, even though the injury occurred on navigable wa-
ters of the United States, on the theory that neither the employment
of the workman nor his activities at the time of the injury had any
direct relation to commerce or navigation. Grant Smith-Porter Co.
v. Rhode, 257 U.S. 469, 477 (1921). Compare Pope & Talbot, Inc. v.
Hawn, 346 U.S. 406, 409 (1953) where the court held that the injury
was related to commerce because the plaintiff's work enabled the ship
to complete its loading for safer transportation of its cargo by water.
42 See cases cited in note 23, supra.
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miralty law should not apply to pleasure boat cases because there
is no commercial element involved and consequently no federal
interest.43 The Supreme Court has occasionally made references to
this argument, but thus far has not had to face the problem square-
ly because commerce by water has been involved in all but one
case it has decided.44
It would seem that there are valid federal interests in pleasure
boating with respect to rules of navigation, right of way, and
safety equipment. Furthermore, pleasure boat accidents and ac-
tivities45 may obstruct commerce. Because pleasure boating may
affect commerce, a federal interest exists and the application of the
uniform maritime law to pleasure boating is warranted.
VI. CHOICE OF LAW PROBLEM IN NEBRASKA
Nebraska has enacted a statute, like many other states, 46 which
poses a problem in the area of pleasure boating. This statute, com-
monly referred to as an imputed negligence statute, makes the
owner of a boat liable for injury or damage occasioned by the
negligent operation of such vessel by another party, if the other
party is operating the vessel with the expressed or implied consent
of the owner.47 This state statute tends to conflict with a federal
statute allowing in certain situations the owner of a vessel to limit
his liability to the value of the boat.48 Under the federal statute a
boat owner may so limit his liability for property damage or per-
sonal injury claims if the accident occurred without his "privity or
knowledge." "Privity or knowledge" in this context has been held
in the case of individual owners to mean "some personal participa-
tion of the owner in the fault or negligence which caused or con-
tributed to the injury."49 In other words, under the federal statute,
the owner is always liable for property damage or personal injury
caused by his boat although unless some actual personal negligence
is proved against the owner he may limit his liability to the value
of the boat. Thus where an owner allowed his children to operate
his boat and they caused a collision the father's liability was so
limited since he had thoroughly trained the children to operate the
43 See Stolz, supra note 38, at 665.
44 Ibid. Cf. Levinson v. Deupree, 345 U.S. 648 (1952).
45 E.g., water skiing is an activity which can hamper commercial traffic.
46 See Stolz, supra note 38, at 664 n.20.
47 NEB. REV. STAT. § 81-815.16 (Supp. 1963).
48 49 Stat. 1478, 46 U.S.C. § 183 (1964). See also AD1mtALTY RULE 51.
See generally GrmoraE & BLACK, op. cit. supra note 2, § 10-1 at 663.
49 Coryell v. Phipps, 317 U.S. 406, 410-12 (1943).
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boat and thus was not negligent in entrusting it to them.50 This
of course does not limit the liability of the boat operator for his
own negligence.
The state statute imposes full liability on the owner of the boat
in situations where the admiralty doctrine would limit his liability.
Under the Nebraska statute, the owner's consent is enough to pro-
vide for full liability and no personal negligence need be shown.
If the language of some United States Supreme Court decisions is
followed, the Nebraska statute would be void because of the inter-
ference with the uniformity required by admiralty law.5 '
VII. DISTINGUISHING FEATURES OF ADMIRALTY LAW
The difference between federal admiralty law, state common
law, and federal law (apart from federal admiralty law), cannot be
fully covered in this article; however, it is possible to point out
some of the basic distinctions.
1. There is no right to a jury trial in admiralty.52
2. Diversity of citizenship and jurisdictional amount are not
required in admiralty.53
3. State statutes of limitation do not apply to admiralty ac-
tions; instead, the doctrine of laches applies.54
4. Generally, neither federal nor state rules of pleading apply
to admiralty actions; 5 instead, admiralty has its own rules.5
5. State rules as to competency of witnesses need not be fol-
lowed in admiralty.57
50 Rautbord v. Ehmann, 190 F.2d 533 (7th Cir. 1951). See also Petition
of Hocking, 158 F. Supp. 620 (D.C.N.J. 1958).
51 E.g., Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1917). But see 37
Tmvmp. L.Q. 537, 538 (1964) where the author comes to the conclusion
that limitation of liability will not have a very wide application in
actions involving small pleasure boats.
52 ADNaRALTY RuLE 46 ; King v. Testerman, 214 F. Supp. 335 (E.D. Tenn.
1963). However, a jury trial is provided as to some actions arising on
lakes or connecting navigable waters. 63 Stat. 953 (1948), 28 U.S.C.
§ 1873 (1952).
53 Romero v. Int'l Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, (1959).
54 Czaplicki v. The Hoegh Silvercloud, 351 U.S. 525, 533 (1956).
55 See Archawski v. Hanioti, 350 U.S. 532 (1956); Levinson v. Deupree,
345 U.S. 648 (1953).
56 See Rules of Practice in Admiralty and Maritime Cases, 28 U.S.C.A.
§ 85 (1950). See also Currie, Unification of the Civil and Admiralty
Rules: Why and How, 17 MAnE L. REv. 1 (1965). The proposed
unification was transmitted to Congress on Feb. 28, 1966.
57 Taylor v. Crain, 224 F.2d 237 (3d Cir. 1955).
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6. State rules as to burden of proof need not be followed in
admiralty.5 8
7. Contract rules may be different in admiralty.5 9
8. Contributory negligence is not a bar in admiralty.60
9. There is no doctrine of assumption of risk in admiralty.61
10. The fellow servant rule is inapplicable in admiralty.6 2
11. A defendant may limit his liability in admiralty.6 3
12. Apart from collision cases,64 there is no contribution be-
tween tortfeasors in admiralty.65
13. The law of admiralty holds a boat owner to a standard of
reasonable care for all visitors, 66 while the law of many states im-
poses different standards depending upon whether the visitor is a
social or business invitee.6 7
14. The scope of review in admiralty is limited.6
This list is by no means a complete coverage of the dissimilari-
ties between admiralty and other laws. However, the list should be
sufficient to point out that practice under the law of admiralty
bears little resemblance to practice under the ordinary federal
and state law.
58 See Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co., 317 U.S. 239 (1942).
59 See Comment, 10 STAN. L. REv. 724, 729-30 (1958).
60 Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406 (1953); The Max Morris,
137 U.S. 1 (1890).
61 Bow v. Pilato, 82 F. Supp. 399 (S.D. Cal. 1949).
62 Kennedy v. Cunard S.S. Co., 189 N.Y. Supp. 402 (App. Div. 1921).
(3 Butler v. Boston & Savannah S.S. Co., 130 U.S. 527 (1889). See
AimuLT RULE 51; 49 Stat. 1479 (1936), 46 U.S.C. § 183-89 (1964).
This doctrine has been severely criticized. GILMoRE & BLACK, Op. Cit.
supra note 2, § 10-13 (1957). See also 79 HAv. L. REv. 425 (1965)
where limitation of liability was refused an insurer being sued under
a direct action statute.
64 In mutual fault collision cases the damages are divided equally with-
out regard to degree of fault. GILMORE & BLACK, op. cit. supra note
67, §§ 7-4, 7-5, 7-18. This is to some extent modified by the major-
minor fault doctrine. Id. § 7-4.
65 Halcyon Lines v. Haenn Ship Ceiling & Refitting Corp., 342 U.S. 282
(1952).
66 See Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 358 U.S. 625,
629-32 (1959).
67 See PROSsEa, TORTS §§ 60-1 (3d ed. 1964).
68 See Kulack v. The Pearl Jack, 178 F.2d 154 (6th Cir. 1949). Review
is limited because finding of facts by the trial judge are conclusive
unless clearly erroneous.
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It is imperative that an attorney when confronted with a case
involving a pleasure boat accident be fully cognizant of the pro-
cedural and substantive niceties inherent in the law of admiralty.
If the pleasure boat accident occurs on a navigable body of water,
any ensuing action will be tried under the maritime law. This
means that the injured party has a choice as to whether the action
may be brought in state or federal court. Although the institution
of an action in a particular forum does not control which substan-
tive law will govern, 69 it will control the procedural law of the
case. 70 Accordingly, the plaintiff will have a choice as to whether
he wants his case tried before a jury in a state court, or whether
he wants the case tried to the judge in a federal admiralty court.
This choice could be either advantageous or disadvantageous de-
pending on the peculiar facts of each case. Similarly, the injured
party would have the initial choice of bringing an action in a fed-
eral court without the usual requirements of diversity of citizenship
and jurisdictional amount. Whether this is an advantage or not
will also depend on the peculiar facts of each case. Because there
are certain distinct advantages and disadvantages to trying a case
under the law of admiralty, an attorney should be aware of the
differences when dealing with a pleasure boat accident case.
VIII. SERVICE OF PROCESS
There are two admiralty rules dealing with service of process.71
However, neither of these rules, nor any of the other admiralty
rules, specify the territorial limits effecting service of process.
Therefore, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and rules related to
state practice may be looked to for determining where a defendant
is amenable to process.7 2 Federal Rule 4(f) provides that a district
court may issue process anywhere within the territorial limits of
the state in which the district is located. Accordingly, if a de-
fendant is found anywhere within the state where the action is
brought he may be served with process.73 If the defendant is not
69 If the action is of admiralty cognizance, admiralty law will apply re-
gardless of the forum. Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205
(1917).
70 See STUMBERG, PRINCIPLES OF CONFLICT OF LAws 133 (3d ed. 1963).
71 ADmIRLTY RULE 1; ADMIRALTY RULE 2.
72 Chilean Line Inc. v. United States, 344 F.2d 757, 760 (2d Cir. 1965);
Patel Cotton Co. v. The Steel Traveler, 107 F. Supp. 191, 193 (S.D.
N.Y. 1952).
78 F. R. Civ. P. 4(f) also provides for service upon defendants brought
in as parties pursuant to Rule 13(h), 14, or 19 at all places outside
the state but within the United States that are not more than 100
miles from the place where the action is commenced.
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within the state where the action is brought, then he must be
served in the manner prescribed by a statute of the United States
or in the manner prescribed by the law of the state in which the
district court is held.7 4 This provision has usually been interpreted
to mean that process can be served upon a defendant who resides
outside the state in which the United States District Court is sit-
ting.7 5
The usual method of obtaining service upon a nonresident is by
the use of a "long arm" statute. With the aid of this legislation, a
resident of a state could obtain service of process on a nonresident
defendant involved in a pleasure boat accident within the state.78
Another method of obtaining service on a nonresident is the
adoption of a water craft'statute. A water craft statute would in
substance provide for service of process on the Secretary of State in
actions against nonresident's growing out of any accident arising
from the nonresident's operation, navigation, or maintenance of
water craft in the state.7 7 In a recent Fifth Circuit opinion, it was
held that service made on a nonresident vessel owner pursuant to
the Louisiana Watercraft Statute applied through Federal Rule
4(d) 7 was entirely proper.7 8 A state then has two methods where-
by a nonresident defendant can be amenable to process for dam-
ages arising out of pleasure boat accidents within the state. Ne-
braska has neither.
IX. CONCLUSION
Although the maritime law was developed under the auspices
of ocean going trade and shipping, the expansion of the admiralty
jurisdiction to include navigable inland waters has brought many
pleasure boats within its domain. The primary objection to the
application of admiralty law to pleasure boating is that it precludes
74 FED. R. COw. P. 4(d)7.
75 Wolfe v. Doucette, 348 F.2d 635, 638-39 (9th Cir. 1965); Farr & Co.
v. Cia. Intercontinental de Nay. de Cuba, S.A., 243 F.2d 342, 347-48
(2d Cir. 1957); Giffin v. Ensign, 234 F.2d 307, 311 (3d Cir. 1956). Some
authorities have interpreted 4(f) to limit state process to service inside
the state where the Federal District Court is sitting. See discussion
of this view in Wolf v. Doucette, supra at 637-38.
70 A boating accident would be a tortious act committed within the state
and therefore within the meaning of the statute. See ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 110, § 17(1)b (1956).
77 See LA. REV. STAT. ANw. §§ 13:3479-80 (1951). See also Kierr, Use of
State Statutes to Effect Service on a Non-Resident Vessel Owner, 8 LA.
B.J. 113 (1960).
78 S.S. Philippine Jose Abad Santos v. Bannister, 335 F.2d 595, 598 (5th
Cir. 1964).
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the state legislature from passing laws in an area where local legis-
latures have generally been thought competent to act. In addition,
it cannot be expected that Congress will be responsible to local
needs in this area.79 On the other hand, the policy behind the uni-
form maritime law, 0 is still as valid today as when it was adopted.
Commerce on rivers, lakes, and the coastlines should not be bur-
dened by diverse state regulations. The justification for applying
federal admiralty law to pleasure boating on navigable waters lies
in the fact that pleasure boating affects commerce by obstructing it
with accidents and increased traffic. In addition the federal gov-
ernment is interested in seeing that pleasure boats follow rules of
navigation and use proper safety equipment. If the states were free
to pass diverse laws in this area, the unpredictability of the outcome
of probable law suits would severely hinder the application of uni-
formity prescribed by the law of admiralty. Therefore, the con-
tinued application of admiralty law to pleasure boat cases is war-
ranted.
Steven G. Seglin '66
79 See Stolz, supra note 38, at 664.
80 The policy of the admiralty grant to Congress in the Constitution is
indicated by Governor Randolph's address to the Virginia Constitu-
tional Convention: "Cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction
cannot, with propriety, be vested in particular state courts. As our
national tranquility and reputation, and intercourse with foreign pow-
ers may be affected by admiralty decisions; as they ought therefore,
to be uniform; and as there can be no uniformity if there be thirteen
distinct jurisdictions,-this jurisdiction ought to be in the federal judi-
ciary. . . ." 3 ELLIOTT's D.BATrEs 571 (1788).
